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BuRGE v. CrrY & CouNTY
[S. F. No. 18876.

OF

In Bank.

SAN FRANCisco [41 C.2d
Oct. 20, 1953.]

LYNDLE E. BURGE, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[1] Judgments - Collateral Attack - Presumptions: MotionsOrders-Collateral Attack.-Ordinarily when an order or a
judgment of court of general jurisdiction is collaterally attacked, the only evidence that may be considered in determining whether order or judgment is void is the record in the
proceeding in which it was entered, and if the record is silent
as to existence of a jurisdictional fact, that fact will be presumed.
[2] Id.- Collateral Attack- Presumptions.-If a proceeding is
wholly statutory and unknown to common law the court, even
though ordinarily one of general jurisdiction, is a court of
special jurisdiction for that proceeding, and if jurisdictional
facts do not appear of record in such proceeding, there is no
presumption of regularity.
[3] Id.-Proof of Judgments-Extrinsic Evidence.-Where presumption of regularity of proceedings is not applicable in a
proceeding which is wholly statutory and unknown to common
law, the failure of the record to recite a jurisdictional fact
does not make judgment void, because extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove such fact except where some statute makes
record the exclusive mode of proof.
[ 4] Infants-Claims-Compromise or Release.-Without statutory
authority a parent, as such, cannot compromise or release his
child's cause of action.
[5] ld.-Claims-Compromise.-Whether proceedings under Prob.
Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minor's disputed
claim, are entitled to presumption of regularity need not be
decided on collateral attack if jurisdictional facts are established by extrinsic evidence.
[6] ld.-Claims-Compromise..-Under Prob. Code,§ 1431, to establish right of mother to compromise a minor's disputed claim,
it must be shown, if father is not dead, that father and mother
are living separate or apart, that mother has care or custody
[1] See Cal.Jur., Judgments,§ 150; Motions and Orders, § 26.
[ 4] Release or compromise by parent of cause of action for injuries to child as affecting right of child, note 103 A.L.R. 500. See,
also, Am.Jur., Parent and Child, § 34.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 297; Motions, § 25;
[2] Judgments, § 296; [3] Judgments, § 540; [4-10, 12-14, 17-19]
Infants,§ 2a; [11] Divorce, § 275; [15, 16] Parent and Child, § 5.
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of minor, that compromise has approval of superior court of
county where minor resides, and that a verified petition in
writing seeking approval of compromise has been filed with
such court.
[7] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-Although it would ordinarily be
better practice to hold a hearing on mother's petition for approval of compromise of minor's disputed claim, the statute
(Prob. Code, § 1431) does not require it. (Disapproving intimation to contrary in Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 652,
660 [169 P.2d 442].)
[8] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-Amendment of Prob. Code, § 1431,
in 1939 so as to provide that claim of minor against third
person may be compromised by "his father, or if his father
is dead or the parents of said minor are living separate or
apart and his mother then has care or custody of said minor
then his mother," covers not only case of desertion or abandonment but any case where father and mother are living
separate or apart, whether reason therefor be desertion, abandonment, agreement of the parties or divorce.
[9] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-By using word "custody" in 1939
amendment of Prob. Code, § 1431, the Legislature made it clear
that if mother and father are living separate or apart, mother
has authority to compromise a minor's disputed claim if she
has custody of minor, whether she has that custody by virtue
of father's abandonment of his family, his inability or refusal
to take custody, or by virtue of court order awarding her
custody.
[10] Id.-Claims-Custody.-An award of joint custody with
father would not be sufficient to give mother authority to
compromise a minor's disputed claim.
[11] Divorce- Custody of Children- To Whom Awarded.-A
divorce decree that awards parents joint custody of child
leaves right to custody as it was during marriage when they
were living together and gives neither a greater right than
he or she had before divorce.
[12] Infants-Claims-Compromise.-"Custody" as used in Prob.
Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minor's disputed
claim by mother when parents are living apart and mother has
care or custody means complete or exclusive custody.
[13] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-Addition of words "care or" before word "custody" in Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minor's disputed claim, indicates a clear legislative purpose not to limit mother's authority to cases in which
she has custody.
[14] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to
compromise of a minor's disputed claim, no more limits "care"
41 C.2d-20
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to some cases of care than it limits "custody" to some cases
of custody; it may not be interpreted as giving either "care"
or "custody" alternative meanings o:r to make either controlling
in some eases and not in others.
[15] Parent and Child-Custody.-Custody embraces sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including
its care; it includes right to child's services and earnings
( Civ. Code, § 197) and right to direct his activities and make
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health
and religion.
[16] Id.-Custody.-When parents are living separate or apart
a court may conclude that best interests of child and due regard for interests of parents require that one or other be given
complete custody, or it may award "legal custody" to one or
both parents and "physical custody" to one parent with or
without right of visitation by other parent, or physical custody may be awarded to a third person, usually a relative.
[17] Infants- Claims- Compromise.-In using words "care or
custody" in Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a
minor's disputed claim, the Legislature by "custody" meant
complete custody or all rights involved in custody, and by
"care" meant what has commonly been called "physical custody" or custodial rights involved in physical care and control
of child.
[18] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-If parents are living separate or
apart and mother has care or physical custody of child, she
may compromise his claims even though she may or may not
have his complete custody.
[19] Id.- Claims- Compromise.-Where parents under divorce
decree have "joint custody and control" of child but mother
has "personal custody," award of personal custody gives her
physical custody and care of child and she therefore has
authority under Prob. Code, § 1431, to compromise disputed
claim of child.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. I. L. Harris, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries.
defendant affirmed.

Judgment for

John F. O'Sullivan, Millington, Dell'Ergo, Weeks & Morrissey for Appellant.
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and Clayton W. Horn,
Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Lyndle E. Burge, a minor, by his
father as guardian ad litem, brought this action against defendant city and county of San Francisco to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by him while he was a
passenger on a street-railway car operated by defendant.
Defendant filed an answer pleading as a special defense that
plaintiff's claim had previously been compromised by his
mother in a proceeding under section 1431 of the Probate
Code. The issue so raised was tried separately pursuant to
section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that the order approving the compromise was not
subject to collateral attack and entered judgment in favor
of defendant. Plaintiff appeals. He concedes that the attack is collateral but contends that the court had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise on the grounds that the
petition for approval of the compromise and the order approving it were fatally defective in failing to recite jurisdictional facts and that even if these facts could be proved in
the present proceeding the record therein discloses that his
mother was without authority to compromise his claim. We
have concluded that this contention cannot be sustained and
that the judgment must therefore be affirmed.
Plaintiff was 14 years old at the time of the accident. His
father and mother had previously been divorced. The interlocutory decree provided that "plaintiff [father] and defendant [mother] have joint custody and control of the said
minor children, with personal custody in the defendant, and
the plaintiff has the right and privilege to visit said minor
children and take them out at all reasonable times." Plaintiff was one of the minor children mentioned in the decree
and lived with his mother after the divorce.
All negotiations leading to the compromise were conducted
between plaintiff's mother and defendant. Plaintiff's father
knew that the accident had occurred and that a claim had
been filed, but he did not participate in the compromise proceedings or become aware of the compromise until after it
had been made. Plaintiff's mother agreed to release his claim
against defendant upon the payment of $500. She filed with
the superior court a verified petition seeking approval of the
compromise, and it was approved. Defendant paid the $500
and plaintiff's mother executed a release. The present action
was brought before plaintiff reached majority.
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The verified petition 1 and the order approving the compromise2 are set forth in the footnotes. Plaintiff contends
at the outset that the court failed to approve the compromise,
on the grounds that the order recites that it approved a ''disputed claim for minor that Iva Burge has against" defendant and that such a claim is not the claim of plaintiff against
defendant. There is nothing to show that there was any
need for a judicial proceeding to approve a compromise of
any claim of her own that plaintiff's mother may have had
against defendant. The proceeding was entitled '' Application of Iva Burge for an order approving the compromise of
disputed claim entered by a minor, Lyndle Burge.'' The verified petition recited that it was the compromise of the minor's
claim for which approval was sought, and the order recited
that it was upon the reading and filing of that petition that
it appeared to the court that the compromise offer was· reasonable. Although the order made a slipshod description
of the claim that was being compromised, when it is read with
the petition, there can be no doubt that the court approved
a compromise of plaintiff's claim against defendant.
It is plaintiff's principal contention that the court lacked
jurisdiction to compromise his claim. [1] Ordinarily when
an order or a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is
collaterally attacked, the only evidence that may be considered
1
"The petition of IvA BuRGE respectfully shows: (1) That petitioner
is the mother of LYNDLE BURGE, a minor, age fourteen, and that both
petitioner and the minor are residents of the City and County of San
Francisco.
"(2) That minor had disputed claim for money against the City and
County of San Francisco for injuries sustained by minor when an accident occurred on August 29, 1945, at Duboce and Fillmore Streets involving a collision of Streetcars 'N' and #22, operated by the City and
County of San Francisco.
"(3) That said City and County of San Francisco offered to pay in
compromise of said claim the sum of FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DoLLARS,
which, in the opinion of petitioner is a reasonable compromise, and that
it will be in the best interests of said minor if said compromise is
accepted by this Court.
''WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the Court approve said compromise
and direct that said money be paid to her without the filing of any
bond.
IVA BURGE
PETITIONER' '
2
" Upon reading and filing the verified petition of IVA BURGE for an
order approving compTomise of the disputed claim for minor that IvA
BuRGE has against the City and County of San Francisco, and it appearing to the Court that the compromise offer is reasonable,
''IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that said compromise be and it is hereby
approved, and that the saicl City and County of San Francisco, is hereby
directed to pay the sum of FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS to IVA
BuRGE, a minor, without the filing of any bond.''
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in determining whether the order or judgment is void is the
record in the proceeding in which it was entered. If the
record is silent as to the existence of a jurisdictional fact,
that fact will be presumed. ( Gtwrdianship of Hall, 31 Cal.2d
157, 164 (187 P.2d 396]; Wells Fargo&; Co. v. City of San
Francisco, 25 Cal.2d 37, 40 (152 P.2d 625] ; cf. Thompson
v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564, 569, 573 [127 P.2d 909] .) [2] It has
been held, however, that if a proceeding is wholly statutory
and unknown to the common law, the court, even though ordinarily one of general jurisdiction, is a court of special jurisdiction for that proceeding, and if jurisdictional facts do
not appear of record in such a proceeding, there is no presumption of regularity. (Estate of Sharon, 179 Cal. 447,
457-458 [177 P. 283]; 49 C.J.S., ,Judgments, p. 840; cf. Estate of Kay, 30 Cal.2d 215, 220-221 [181 P.2d 1].) [3] If
the presumption is not applicable, however, failure of the
record in such a proceeding to recite a jurisdictional fact
''does not make the judgment void, for extrinsic evidence is
admissible to prove such fact, except where some statute makes
the record the exclusive mode of proof." (Estate of Sharon,
supra, 179 Cal. at p. 458.)
[4] It is the general rule that without statutory authority
a parent, as such, cannot compromise or release his child's
cause of action. (See 103 A.L.R. 500; 39 Am.Jur. 629.)
[5] It has been held, however, that proceedings under section
1431 are entitled to the presumption of regularity. (Rico
v. Nasser Bros. Realty Co., 58 Cal.App.2d 878, 882 (137 P.2d
861].) Plaintiff, relying on the Sharon case, supra, contends
that the Rico case was erroneously decided. Defendant, on
the other hand, contends that the Hall and Wells Fargo cases,
supra, are controlling. It is unnecessary, however, to resolve
these contentions if the jurisdictional facts are established by
the extrinsic evidence.
[6] Under section 1431, to establish the right of the mother
to compromise a minor's disputed claim, it must be shown,
if the father is not dead, that (1) the father and mother are
living separate or apart; (2) the mother has the care or custody of the minor; (3) the compromise has the approval of
the superior court of the county where the minor resides;
and ( 4) a verified petition in writing seeking approval of the
compromise has been filed with such court.
Plaintiff contends that a hearing on the petition is also
required. Plaintiff and his mother testified in the present
proceeding that neither was present in court when the order
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approving the compromise was made and that no testimony
was taken relating to the extent of his injuries or the fairness
of the compromise. The trial court granted defendant's motion to strike this testimony. No error appears. [7] Although it would ordinarily be better practice3 to hold a hearing and take testimony, the statute does not require it. (Rico
v. Nasser Bros. Realty Co., supra, 58 Cal.App.2d 878, 881.)
Plaintiff relies on Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 652 [169
P.2d 442], for a contrary rule. There, however, the proceeding was under section 196a of the Civil Code. The court
was careful to point out that even if section 1431 were deemed
to apply to actions by a child under section 196a (see 2 Armstrong, California Family Law, p. 1084), no attempt had been
made to compromise the child's claim thereunder, since the
parent had never filed a verified claim for approval of the
compromise as required by section 1431. (74 Cal.App.2d at
p. 660.) Insofar as the court intimated that a hearing would
be necessary had the proceeding been under section 1431,
the statement was unnecessary .to the decision in the case
and is contrary to Rico v. Nasser Bros. Realty Co., S~[pra.
The verified petition and the order approving the compromise disclose that requirements ( 3) and ( 4) above were
met, but do not disclose that (1) the father and mother were
living separate or apart or that (2) the mother had the care
or custody of plaintiff. Extrinsic evidence, however, established that the father and mother were divorced and were
living apart at the time of the compromise. The controlling
question that remains, therefore, is whether it was also proved
that the mother then had the "care or custody" of plaintiff. To answer that question we must first determine what
the Legislature meant by the terms "care or custody."
Until 1939, section 1431 of the Probate Code provided that
a disputed claim of a minor could be compromised by his
mother only if "his father is dead or has deserted or aban"Rule 28(c) of the Superior Court Rules (33 Cal.2d 14, effective January 1, 1949, whieh was after the compromise in this case) provides:
"Upon the hearing of the petition, the person compromising the claim on
behalf of the minor or incompetent and the minor or incompetent shall
be in attendance unless for good cause the court dispenses with such
personal appearance. The court may require the presence and testimony
of the attending <'>r examining physician, as well as other evidence relating
to the merits of the claim, the nature and extent of the injury, care,
treatment and hospitalization.'' Attendance of the parties and the
taking of evidence is even today not mandatory and a compromise can
still be effected without such testimony and attendance, if, in the discretion of the trial judge, good cause is shown. As to the taking of
testimony, the word "may" is of course permissive.
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do ned him." It was held that under this wording of the
section the mother could not compromise a claim when the
parents were divorced, even though the mother had been
awarded custody o£ the minor. (In re Parrino (1937), 24
CaL A pp.2d 128 [74 P .2d 549] . ) The decision in the Parrino
case prompted the Legislature in 1939 to reexamine section
1431 of the Probate Code. It amended the section to provide
that a claim of a minor against a third person may be compromised by "his rather, or if his father is dead or the
parents of said minor are living separate or apart and his
mother then has care or custody of said minor then his
mother." 4 The amendment not only met the situation of the
Parrino case but extended the mother's authority in other
respects. The Parrino case problem could have been met by
simply adding to the old phrase the words "or for other
reasons 5 the mother has custody of him.'' Instead, the
Legislature substituted a complete new phrase. [8] The
broad language of the new phrase covers not only a mise of
desertion or abandonment but any case where the father and
mother are living separate or apart, 6 whether the reason
therefor be desertion, abandonment, agreement of the parties
or divorce. [9] Furthermore, by using the word ''custody''
the Legislature made it clear that if the mother and father
are living separate or apart, the mother has authority to
compromise if she has custody of the minor, whether she has
that custody by virtue of the father's abandonment of his
family, his inability or refusal to take custody, or by virtue
of a court order awarding her custody.
[10] An award of joint custody with the father would not,
however, be sufficient to give the mother authority to compromise. Even though living apart, the parents are both entitled to custody unless one is unable or refuses to take
custody or has abandoned his or her family ( Civ. Code, § 197),
or unless the sole custody of the child has been awarded to
4
A similar amendment was made in 1939 to section 376 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, but was removed in 1949. (Of. Espinosa v. Haslam
(1935), 8 Cal.App.2d 213 [ 47 P.2d 479].)
5
Under section 197 of the Civil Code, the mother is entitled to custody
if the father is dead or has abandoned his family, or is unable or refuses
to take custody.
"This language was probably suggested by Civil Code, section 198,
which provides: ''The husband and father, as such, has no right superior
to those of the wife and mother, in regard to the care, custody, education,
and control of the children of the marriage, while such husband and wife
live separate and apart from each other.''
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one of them. (Watkins v. Clemmer, 129 Cal.App. 567, 574
[19 P.2d 303].) [11] A divorce decree that awards the
parents joint custody leaves the right to custody as it was
during the marriage when they were living together and gives
neither a greater right than he or she had before the divorce.
[12] Custody as used in section 1431 therefore means complete or exclusive custody.
[13] Had the Legislature used only the word ''custody''
instead of the words ''care or custody'' there could be no
doubt that it meant to limit the mother's authority to compromise to cases in which she has custody. Had it meant to
make both care and custody a condition to the mother's authority to compromise it would have used the word ''and''
instead of the word "or. " 7 The addition of the words "care
or" seems therefore to indicate a clear legislative purpose
not to limit the mother's authority to cases in which she has
custody.
It has been suggested that the words "care or" were added
to the statute only for cases in which custody has not already
been adjudicated, to relieve the court, because of the difficult
factual and legal questions that may be involved, of the necessity of having to determine whether or not the mother has
custody of the minor. In such cases it is necessary to establish only that the mother has care of the minor, but if the
custody has already been adjudicated, and the mother has
not been awarded custody, she has no authority to compromise, even though she has the care of the minor. Under
this interpretation, even if the father has not abandoned his
family and is able and willing to take custody and the mother
does not therefore have custody, she may nevertheless compromise if she has the care of the minor. If the reason she
does not have custody, however, is a previous adjudication
of custody, she cannot compromise even though she has the
care of the minor. Thus in some cases ''care'' would be controlling, and it would be immaterial that the mother did not
have custody of the minor. In other cases "custody" would
be controlling, and it would be immaterial that the mother
had ''care'' of the minor.
7
The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1082, amending section
1431 in 1939, indicates that the statute was deliberately written in the
disjunctive. As introduced, the bill provided that the mother could compromise a claim of a minor ''if his father is dead or the parents of said
child are living separate and apart and his mother then has custody.''
'l'he bill as finally passed provided, ''if his father is dead or the parents
of said minor are living separate or apart and his mother than has
care or custody." (Changes indicated by italics.)
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[14] The statute, however, no more admits of limiting
''care'' to some cases of care than it does of limiting '' custody" to some cases of custody. The child may actually be
taken care of in an institution or by a stranger or relative and
yet the mother may have custody of it, including the right to
its care, by virtue of the father's abandonment of his family
or his inability or refusal to take custody. In such a case
the mother would have the right to compromise, since the LegiRlature did not limit "custody" to custody derived from a
court order. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that
"(mstody" has a double meaning, that in cases in which it is
necessary to establish custody before a compromise can be
approved it is to be interpreted as meaning custody however
derived, but for the purpose of rendering "care or" meaningless, it is to be interpreted as meaning custody derived
from a court order when there is such an order. Had the
Legislature meant to give either "care" or "custody" alternative meanings or to make either controlling in some cases
and not in others, it would have said so. It placed these words
in the statute unmodified by other words that would suggest
that they were not of equal force or were not to be applied
in the disjunctive in all cases. We are not at liberty to restrict and expand at will the application of these words or
to seek hidden meanings in them to accomplish a purpose that
does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.
Plaintiff contends that "care or custody" mean the same
thing and that the Legislature therefore did not give the
mother authority to compromise a minor's claim in cases in
which she does not have custody. The words "care or," however, were deliberately added, and cannot be regarded as superfluous, if a reasonable construction thereof will give effect to
them and preserve all the other words of the statute.
[15] Custody embraces the sum of parental rights with
respect to the rearing of a child, including its care. It includes the right to the child's services and earnings ( Civ.
Code, § 197) and the right to direct his activities and make
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health.
and religion. (Lerner v. Superior Co?trt, 38 Cal.2d G7G, 681
[242 P.2d 321] ; see 2 Armstrong, California :B'amily Law,
p. 954.) These rights are exercised by both parents in an
undivided home ( Civ. Code, § 197) and differences between
them are ordinarily resolved at home without the necessity
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of invoking the aid of a court. [16] When the parents are
living separate or apart, however, there are apt to be not
only frequent differences of opinion with respect to any of
the matters involved in custody, but frequent resort to courts
for their settlement. In such cases a court may conclude
that the best interests of the child and due regard for the
interests of the parents require that one or the other be
given complete custody of the child. It may conclude that
such action would be unjust, and unable like Solomon to
carve the child, it may carve out of the sum of custodial
rights, certain rights to be exercised by each parent. Thus
it is common practice in divorce cases for the court to award
''legal custody'' to one or both parents and ''physical custody" to one parent with or without the right of visitation
by the other parent, or physical custody may even be awarded
to a third person, usually a relative. Decisions made in the
exercise of the rights awarded are not necessarily final, for
the court's orders are subject to modification. ( Civ. Code,
§ 138; Cooney v. Cooney, 25 Cal.2d 202, 205 [153 P.2d 334],
and cases cited.)
[17] We believe the Legislature had this practice in mind
when it used the words "care or custody." By "custody,"
it meant complete custody or all the rights involved in custody. By "care" it meant what has commonly been called
"physical custody" or the custodial rights involved in the
physical care and control of the child. The Legislature was
alsq aware that in many cases fathers and mothers may be
living apart where there have been no divorce or other proceedings adjudicating the right to custody. It may be unknown where the father is or uncertain whether or not he
has forfeited his rights to custody. (See 2 Armstrong, California Family Law, p. 1006 et seq.) In such cases, if the
mother has the care of the child, it is not necessary that there
also be a judicial determination that she has his complete
custody. [18] Thus, if the parents are living separate or
apart, and the mother has the care or physical custody of the
child, she may compromise his claims even though she may or
may not also have his complete custody.
[19] In the present case, the parents were living apart
and the child lived with his mother. Under the divorce decree the parents had "joint custody and control" but the
mother had "personal custody." There can be no doubt that
the award of personal custody gave her the physical custody
and care of the child. Having the care of the child, she had
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authority under section 1431 of the Probate Code to compromise the claim in question.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
At the time this matter arose, section 1431 of the Probate
Code provided, in part, that when a minor has a disputed
claim for damages "his father, or if his father is dead or
the parents of said minor are living separate or apart and
his mother then has care or custody of said minor then his
mother, shall have the right to compromise, or execute a
covenant not to sue . . . . " (Emphasis added.)
Although it did not appear in the mother's petition for
approval of the settlement of the minor's claim, or in the
court's order of approval, that the father was dead, or that
the child's parents were living separate or apart, or that she
had the care or custody of the child, extrinsic evidence
showed that the parents were divorced and that by court
decree, they were given joint legal custody with "personal"
custody in the mother.
A majority of this court has determined that the words
"care or custody" were intended by the Legislature to give
the mother authority to compromise a disputed claim if she
had the care of the child whether or not she had custody of
him. ''The addition of the words 'care or' seems therefore
to indicate a clear legislative purpose not to limit the mother's
authority to cases in which she has custody." This holding,
of course, makes a nullity of the court order awarding joint
custody to both parents with physical, or personal, custody
in one of them. \Vith separated, or divorced, parents, it is
impossible for both to have personal custody of the childone must have it since, as pointed out in the majority opinion,
the court cannot "like Solomon . . . carve the child." We
have held (Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 676 [242 P.2d
321] ) that custody includes the right to direct the child's
activities and make decisions regarding his care, control,
education, health and religion. The father here, by court
order, had the rights above enumerated but a majority of
this court interprets the statute so as to deprive him of a voice
in making a major decision having to do with the child's
future welfare, education and health. The majority concedes,
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as indeed it must, that an award of joint custody with the
father would not be sufficient to give the mother authority
to compromise and yet it is held that because the mother had
the person of the child in her care, she did have the authority.
As I have heretofore pointed out, when parents are living
separate and apart, the person of the child must be with one
or the other but the decree giving them joint custody gives
neither a greater right to control than either had before the
divorce.
I am of the opinion that the use of the words ''care or
custody" by the Legislature was intended to take care of the
situation where there was no court order giving custody to
one, or both, parents or where the mother had the care of
the child because the father had abandoned or deserted his
family and his whereabouts were unknown. Under the interpretation of the majority, the mother, having physical
custody and care of the child, could compromise a claim for
him even though sole legal custody had been awarded to
the father or even if she had the care of the child for a week,
or a week end, with sole custody in the father. For example,
it is said "If the reason she does not have custody, however, is a previous adjudication of custody, she cannot compromise even though she has the care of the minor. Thus
in some cases 'care' would be controlling, and it would be
immaterial that the mother did not have custody of the
minor. In other cases 'custody' would be controlling, and
it would be immaterial that the mother had 'care' of the
minor." It appears to me that if there has been no formal
adjudication of custody, and one parent has the care of the
minor, because the other has abandoned it, that is a matter
easily established in the petition for approval; or, on the other
hand, if custody has been formally adjudicated, that matter
also may be established. If one parent had legal custody,
and the other had the temporary care of the child, the one
having temporary care would hardly be the one authorized to
compromise a claim which might have a far-reaching effect
on the child's future. It is said that under this interpretation,
if the parents are separated even if the father has not abandoned the child, and is ready and able to take custody but
custody has not been adjudicated to the mother, she having the
care of the child, may compromise his claim. Since the matter
of the parents living separate and apart .~hou-ld appear in the
petition for approval (Prob. Code, § 1431), the court could,
before approving the settlement, require the father's consent
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thereto since neither parent has a greater right than the other.
The words ''care'' and ''custody'' were used in the disjunctive to take care of two different situations and to interpret them as I think they should be interpreted would give
effect to both words and would not make a nullity out of a
court order awarding custody to one, or both, parents. As the
majority interprets them, the word "custody" means nothing
if the mother has the "care" of the minor.
Since it seems clear to me that the mother had no authority
to compromise the claim of the minor, I would reverse the
judgment.

[Crim. No. 5483.
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[1] Homicide-Appeal-Modification of Judgment.-Where trial
court is vested with discretion to determine punishment of
defendant convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 190),
and there has been no error, Supreme Court has no power to
substitute its judgment for that of trial court as to penalty
to be imposed.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239b)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
and from an order denying a new trial. David Coleman,
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty affirmed.
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